I have been talking to several physicists that know and don’t know quantum mechanical specifics. Typically, they say ‘who knows’. Some felt that future theories may overcome the need for the ‘conscious observer’. Some identified the ensemble quantum theory as having solved the need for the conscious observer — this can be interpreted as the universe is conscious of itself). BUT the physicists that thought that the conscious observer had been dispelled could not identify the paper or presentation of the ensemble theory that eliminated the conscious observer requirement.

I have yet to talk with Dr. Peak, who probably is the best physicist at USU as far as knowing the specifics of the philosophy-science interface.

This informal survey supports my earlier assessment. Physicists are uncomfortable with the ‘conscious observer’ interpretation of quantum experiments. They want it to go away for the most part. But no one seems to know of a definitive demonstration that the requirement has been overcome. Rather, most physicists would prefer and have a hazy belief that the conscious observer requirement has been or will be overcome.

The observer is not specified as a conscious mind by physics. The quantum mind theory is one produced by psychology rather than physics, and is further muddled by philosophical interpretations.

Per the calculator example (which is probably thoroughly off track now), or even more abstractly, any electronic computer- you have the transistor sequence in the appropriate on/off (assuming binary transistors, even though trinary transistors are now trivial to produce) 01000001. This could be a byte, two nibbles, the upper or lower part of a word, dword, or whatever representing a memory location, operation, symbolic or numeric value, or any of a hundred other things.

When investigating the programing it is necessary to determine not just this meaning, but the meaning of all abstracted inputs, the circuit state changes, and the subsequent outputs. If we additionally had no knowledge of the purpose of the object (i.e. to calculate mathematical transactions), any analysis would be further complicated, and as the number of unknowns that require interpretation increase so does the degree of arbitrariness of our conclusions? (essentially as context is continually diminished our determination of various meaning is reduced in confidence)

Is this the gist of the problem assertion, or at least rough ballpark?

Well to be clear, I am familiar with Aristotle, though I would not in any way claim the same authority as yourself (professionally I am an expert at software security, not philosophy). My gripe with him is primarily one based on science – his physical laws are grossly wrong, so much so that a five year old tossing a rock could observe his idea for ballistic motion are not just wrong, but wrong to the point of stupidity. Yet because of the strength of his name such laws were treated like gospel for 2000 years, with all questions of them silenced. I mean gospel in an almost literal sense, as the Roman Catholic Church relied on Aristotle’s views to justify their terra-centric view of the solar system which they wrongly persecuted Galileo for questioning. Aristotle directly used his clout to silence the deterministic notions of Atomos from Democritus on the grounds that such notions were speculative, in order to advance his own captain planet flavored view on elements, which were both speculative, and wrong. His clout, his name, and his stance of things silenced all other inquiry for two millennium; he is quite possibly the most retarding element of scientific inquiry in human existence, to physics what Freud is to psychology.

Because of that I have a hard time taking the notion that we should respect his views on gathering knowledge, since the methods his views are used to criticize have proven accurate while his own methods produce results that do not withstand even cursory observation. When it comes to results that could explain our world, his methods did not produce fruit.

His postulates are very analogous to M-Theory (or its predecessor, string theory) – beautifully logically consistent, rhetorically elegant, and not at all verified against real world phenomena (which is unfair to M-Theory – it does actually support many real world phenomena, it just has yet to produce novel verifiable predictions that are not covered by competing hypothesis. Even if superparticles are verified much of M-theory will remain entirely speculative). Empirically, Aristotle’s methods of defining physical truth were wholesale failures.

I have a hard time accepting the arguments of a man who thought that if you shaved off a piece of oak from a freshly made bed and planted it, it would grow back into a tree because the wood knew its proper form and would return to it freed from the constraints of man’s will put upon it. There is an easy experiment to establish the validity of such a claim – actually do it. However Aristotle did not care about the empirical validity of his ideas, simply the rhetorical validity, so the notion that he should verify his ideas never seemed to have occurred to him (or if they did, the experiments are lost to history). His idea of form and shape had some serious problems with reality. Even if you hold to his philosophical strengths, you have to grant that his physical assertions were pretty far off the mark.

I got caught up with a philosophical argument and so did start using a bunch of “tribal language” without explaining what it all meant. My apologies to non-philosophers. Stanford encyclo is, though, a nice source so glad you found that. Two quick thoughts:

a) I think hylomorphism (the view that substances are form-matter composites, as opposed to substance dualism which holds that form and matter are two different substances) are different enough that I resist the “close enough” point. Non-philosophers might see this as quibbling, but there really is an important distinction to be made (it is the distinction between Platonists and Aristotelians).

b) I do not think “beauty is in the eye of beholder” in the regular sense of that phrase – that beauty is entirely relative to subjective/relative judgments (where x might be beautiful ‘for me’ but not ‘for you’). But that is not what Hunt was saying. I agree with Hunt’s meaning of the phrase (as do Aristotle and Aquinas!) – that without a beholder there is no such thing as beauty. This because beauty is not a substance, it is an “accidental” (non-essential) property of some substances. So Hunt and I agree here – we both think Plato is wrong on this. Hooray! The question is … is Aristotle right?

Beauty is in the eye of the beholder; therefore without a beholder, there is no beauty.

Yes!

Beauty is in the eye of the holder; therefore without a beholder, there is no beauty.

There are few outside the discipline of philosophy who even know what “hylomorphism” means. I had to look it up on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and now have a cursory understanding. You have to realize that you’re using specialized terminology. I get that it isn’t equivalent to dualism, but dualism is probably close enough for my purposes. Wikipedia also tells me that Aristotle believed in thought existing outside the body, a view you seem to endorse with reference to an “agent intellect that understands words.”

Teleology is easier to deal with. Atheists often have a hard time with it because they (we) don’t acknowledge an extrinsic universal purpose, “final cause,” or what have you. Since this is in direct contradiction to teleology, it shouldn’t be too surprising why it is rejected.

About the non-material:
I’m not sure that I “admitted” to anything, since this has been my view all along. But yes, I agree with you. The question is, do these things have substance — I would prefer to say “are they real” — or are they merely properties of emergent systems. You could convince me more easily of the substance of “being a circle” than you could of “sunset beauty.” It really does get back to the “if a tree falls in the forst…” question, though I prefer the sunset beauty scenario. If tomorrow every human on earth dropped dead, would the sunset still be beautiful? I think there are very good reasons to think that it would not, barring the possibility that a stray dolphin might find it enjoyable. Why would it not be? Because “sunset beauty” is a property of the human mind, the ability to appreciate a sunset, and not a property of the sunset. And if all humans cease to exist, the property does as well.

Kierkegaard does scare me as well but I recognize his problem as only considering self in isolation. But I am fascinated by his use of paradox as a necessary concept to embrace in living.